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strength of inherited tastes and the coefficients of risk 
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illustrations indicate that the case for a negative effect is 
rather weak. Using a French data set on transfers within the 
family, we investigate how transmission habits affect the 
level of private assistance. We show that parents are more 
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1. Introduction 
It is now well known that bequests within the family are 
potentially important from the viewpoint of public policy, 
both on equality and efficiency grounds. For example, the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy is related to the motives for 
income transfers within the family. While bequests may arise 
accidentally given an uncertain life span, economists have 
mainly focused on models with voluntary bequests, which may be 
either relevant from altruism or from exchange (Masson and 
Pestieau, 1997). When altruistic bequests are operative, the 
Ricardian equivalence holds and attempts by the government to 
redistribute income between generations are fully neutralized 
(see Barro, 1974). Conversely, with exchange considerations, a 
public redistribution of income may have sizable effects. 
Knowing whether family motives are relevant from altruism 
or from exchange is an empirical question. To discriminate 
between the two hypotheses, one has to examine the impact of 
the recipient’s income on the gift value received from parent 
(Cox, 1987). A negative effect holds under altruism, while a 
positive relationship is only consistent with exchange. While 
some studies have shown that more money was given to richer 
children, recent empirical findings rather argue in favor of 
altruism (see the discussion in Laferrère and Wolff, 2002). 
However, the strong neutrality prediction of the altruism 
hypothesis is never supported by the data (Altonji et alii, 
1997). Parents imperfectly adjust their financial help when 
the intrafamily distribution of income is changed. 
Since empirical evidence for transfers casts doubt both on 
altruism and exchange motives, several authors have recently 
suggested expanding the analysis of family behavior from two 
generations to three generations (Arrondel and Masson, 2001, 
Cox and Stark, 1996). This leads to the definition of indirect 
reciprocities within the family, upward or downward, forward-
looking or backward-looking, such that one generation makes a 
transfer to another generation and is paid back later by a 
third generation. For instance, according to the demonstration 
effect theory of transfer, parents shape the preferences of 
their children by setting an example (Cox and Stark, 1996, 
Jellal and Wolff, 2000). Parents care for their own parents in 
order to be helped in the future by their own children. 
In the numerous studies dealing with the intergenerational 
transmission mechanism (see Behrman et alii, 1995), the role 
of the parents in the formation of their children's income 
capacity has mainly concentrated i) on human capital 
transmission and ii) on wealth transfers. However, with recent 
developments on preference formation, economists are now 
convinced that the parental influence on the status of 
children cannot be limited to educational investments and 
inheritances. 
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Another channel of parental transmission relates to the 
connection between childhood experiences and future behavior, 
a question dealing with habits, cultural transmission and 
endogenous preferences (Becker, 1992, 1996, Bisin and Verdier, 
2001). Using detailed illustrations, Becker (1996) shows that 
parents influence the experiences of their children during the 
formative early years. Thus, adult behaviors are expected to 
be strongly correlated with childhood experiences. From an 
empirical viewpoint, drawing on cultural transmission of 
altruistic values, Jellal and Wolff (2002) note that elders 
who have care for their own parents in the past are more 
likely to be helped in return by their own children. 
With very few exceptions (de la Croix, 1996, de la Croix 
and Michel, 1999), the role of these childhood-acquired habits 
has been widely neglected in economic analyses. For example, 
if one examines the standard altruistic model of transfer made 
famous by Becker (1991), the utility of an adult depends only 
on his own level of consumption and on the well-being of his 
child, but it is not affected by his own parents' past 
consumption. While this assumption of independence over time 
simplifies the study of many economic problems, accounting for 
the influence of past experiences and social forces on current 
behaviors is an insightful research. 
Accounting for links between the past and the present has 
profound implications for the analysis of both microeconomic 
and macroeconomic problems. On the one hand, including the 
different ways the past influences present preferences may 
explain why parents attempt to influence the formation of 
their children's preferences (Becker, 1993). From a public 
policy perspective, it follows that policy redistribution may 
have long term effects on family assistance in the future, 
given the dynamic process of socialization. On the other hand, 
incorporating past experiences provides helpful explanations 
of why there exist fluctuations in both output and employment 
and long-term oscillations (de la Croix, 2001). 
Thus, in this paper, we investigate the role of inherited 
habits on family transfer behavior using a simple approach. In 
a very stimulating paper, Frank (1989) argues that one has to 
find an appropriate frame of reference within which to 
evaluate personal levels of consumption. In order to account 
for the presence of inherited habits, the solution suggested 
by de la Croix (1996) and de la Croix and Michel (1999) is to 
use an extended utility function, in which standard-of-living 
aspirations are transmitted from one generation to the next. 
The influence of parents is introduced in a simple way in the 
model, by assuming that the utility function of an adult also 
depends on the past level of consumption of his own parents. 
The purpose of our paper is to examine the implications and 
relevance of the assumption of extended preferences on the 
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choices of intergenerational transfers within the family when 
motives for private income redistribution are driven by purely 
altruistic feelings. When analyzing how such aspiration levels 
affect the pattern of benevolent transfers from parents to 
children, we prove that inherited aspiration effect does not 
necessarily increase parental transfers. However, numerical 
illustrations indicate that the case for a negative effect is 
rather weak. The relevance of the model is then tested using a 
French data set on transfers within families. In particular, 
we investigate how transmission habits affect the level of 
private assistance. We show that inherited habits play a 
central role in the decisions of family transfers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2, we present a model of bequests in which parents are 
purely altruistic towards their children and each generation 
inherits life standard aspirations from parents. In section 3, 
we present the data and the econometric analysis reveals that 
parents are more likely to help their children when they have 
themselves received money from their own parents. Concluding 
comments dealing with public policy are in section 4. 
 
2. Altruism with inherited habits 
2.1. The standard altruism model 
Let us consider a model of altruistic transfers defined 
over two periods, with two generations and one composite good. 
The first generation consists of one parent, who is only 
present in the first period. At the end of this period, the 
parent leaves a bequest to his unique child. Let subscripts p 
and k denote the parent and the child, respectively. Only 
financial transfers are included in the analysis, and we rule 
out the possibility that the parent both invests in the 
child's human capital through education and leaves a bequest. 
When the motive for family transfer is altruistic (Becker, 
1991), the parent's utility U is an increasing function of his 
consumption Cp and of the child's utility V. Conversely, the 
child is selfish and his utility function is an increasing 
function of his consumption Ck. Then, the parent attempts to 
maximize U(Cp,V(Ck)). Without loss of generality, we restrict 
our attention to the case of a separable parental utility, so 
that the parental utility is : 
U(Cp)+βp V(Ck)     (1) 
where βp is the caring parameter (βp∈]0;1[). Furthermore, we 
assume that U and V are continuous, three-time differentiable 
and strictly concave, i.e. U’>0, U’’<0, V’>0, V’’<0. 
Each generation receives an exogenous income, respectively 
Yp and Yk. We admit that family assistance is directed from the 
parent to the child. The budget constraints are as follows. 
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First, the parental income Yp is devoted to the consumption Cp 
and to the altruistic bequest T, so that Cp=Yp-T. Second, the 
child's consumption Ck is the sum of his income Yk and the 
transfer T received from the parent, invested in the financial 
market at the interest rate r and yielding an amount (1+r)T. 
Then, the child's budget constraint is Ck=Yk+(1+r)T. A last 
constraint deals with the non-negativity of the bequest, such 
that T≥0. The two generations pool their resources for an 
interior transfer T>0 since Ck+(1+r)Cp=Yk+(1+r)Yp. 
The problem for the parent is to choose the transfer
 
T≥0 to 
maximize U(Yp-T)+βp V(Yk+(1+r)T). The first-order condition is 
Uc=(1+r)βpVc (with Uc=∂U/∂Cp and Vc=∂V/∂Ck), which means that the 
parent's marginal utility of consumption is equalized with the 
child's marginal utility of consumption as it is perceived by 
the parent. Thus, the gift value is compensatory. It is an 
increasing function of the parent's income, but it decreases 
with the child's income. Besides, the difference in transfer-
income derivatives is ∂T/∂Yp-∂T/∂Yk=1 (Altonji et alii, 1997). A 
shift of the parent's income towards the child (assuming a 
fixed family income) leads to a perfect adjustment of the gift 
value, just equal to the former variation in incomes between 
generations. Altruism corresponds to a perfect insurance 
system between parent and child against any positive or 
negative event leaving total family income unchanged. 
 
2.2. Altruism and aspiration levels 
To account for the influence on past consumption on present 
choices, we extend the model in the following way. We 
introduce the idea that each generation inherits life standard 
aspirations from the previous generation. This hypothesis that 
the child becomes habituated to a certain standard-of-living 
when he is living with his parent is highly realistic. Let 
h∈]0;1[ be a parameter that measures the intensity of the 
effect of the intergenerational spillover. The bequeathed 
tastes provide a frame of reference against which both the 
parent's and the child's utility functions are judged. Given 
these extended preferences, the parent's utility is now : 
U(Cp-hCg)+βpV(Ck-hCp)     (2) 
where Cg is the consumption of the grandparent. We assume that 
the strength of the aspiration effect given by h remains 
constant across each succeeding generation. 
The fact that h is a fixed parameter over time may be seen 
as a strong assumption. For instance, one could rather argue 
that there are in fact two values for the habit effect, one 
for grandparent-to-parent transmission and one for parent-to-
child transmission. But these two parameters are not 
independent, since h is the result of a preference shaping 
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process within the family. In this paper, we follow the 
approach developed by de la Croix (1996) with a fixed h. A 
more general approach is when the parameter ht for the 
generation t is a function of the aspiration level ht-1 of the 
previous generation t-1, such that ht=f(ht-1). The conclusions 
of our model are not affected when the inequality f’>0 holds, 
which is the essence of the preference formation theory. 
The budget constraints of the standard altruism model still 
hold in this extended framework. Using Cp=Yp-T and Ck=Yk+(1+r)T, 
the parental utility becomes : 
U(Yp-T-hCg)+βpV(Yk+(1+r+h)T-hYp)   (3) 
While our presentation focuses on family transfers in the 
form of bequest, another interpretation is to consider the 
inheritance amount T as an educational investment. In this 
setting, r would be seen as the rate of return on human 
capital, Yk as the child's human capital endowment resulting 
from native ability and public environmental influences, and T 
as the private expenditure made of the child's education. 
Let us now characterize the optimal transfer solution when 
the second-period consumption of the child is certain. The 
parent has perfect information on his child's level of income, 
which is more likely when the two generations share the same 
household or when they live close to each other. 
With an interior solution, the parent chooses a positive 
amount of bequest T that maximizes (3). It follows that the 
optimal level of transfer T* is given by : 
-Uc(Yp-T*-hCg)+βp(1+r+h)Vc(Yk+(1+r+h)T*-hYp)=0  (4) 
So, at the equilibrium, the marginal cost Uc of transferring 
resources to the child is equalized with the weighted child's 
marginal consumption βp(1+r+h)Vc. We can now explore the 
consequences of these inherited aspiration levels on the 
optimal amount of bequest to the child.  
 
2.3. The effect of aspiration levels 
How does the intergenerational externality h affect the 
structure of bequests ? As noted by de la Croix and Michel 
(1999), the aspiration effect induces a desire of catching-up 
and the new generation is expected to consume more than the 
parent did. Intuitively, one would expect that the parameter h 
exert a positive effect on the amount transferred. While this 
result is more likely to hold, we demonstrate that the 
intensity of bequeathed tastes may sometimes decrease the 
level of private transfer bestowed to the child. 
Proposition 1. The intensity of bequeathed tastes positively 
affects the bequest value, unless the taste externality is 
important and the parent has a strong risk aversion. 
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Proof. By differentiating (4), we get :  
dT*/dh=-(UccCg+βpVc+(1+r+h) βp(T*-Yp)Vcc)/(Ucc+βp(1+r+h)2Vcc) 
Given the assumption of concavity and using Cp=Yp-T, we have: 
sgn dT*/dh = sgn CgUcc/Vc+ βp- βp(1+r+h)CpVcc/Vc 
Using the first-order condition Vc=Uc/ βp(1+r+h), the sign of 
the derivative dT*/dh is now : 
sgn dT*/dh = sgn 1/(1+r+h)+Cpσk-Cgσp 
where σp=-Ucc/Uc and σk=-Vcc/Vc are the coefficients of risk 
aversion respectively for the parent and the child.  
Thus, we need to study the two following cases. When Cpσk≥Cgσp, 
the sign of dT*/dh is always positive since 1/(1+r+h)>0. But 
when Cpσk<Cgσp, the sign of dT*/dh depends on the value of h. 
Let h0 be the value of the spillover such that : 
h0=1/(Cgσp-Cpσk)-(1+r) 
Thus, the degree of aspiration effect positively affects the 
amount of bequest to the child when h<h0 (dT*/dh>0), while the 
converse holds for h>h0. When the parent is characterized by a 
low level of consumption and a strong risk aversion, the 
intensity of the taste externality is expected to decrease the 
value of the bequest for h>h0. QED 
 Let us interpret this proposition. The parent's consumption 
is like a negative externality, which is internalized through 
transfers inside the family. Thus, proposition 1 seems to some 
extent surprising, since standard economic reasoning leads to 
the expectation that transfers should be strictly increasing 
in h. The stronger the externality, the larger the transfer 
necessary to compensate the affected. There are in fact two 
types of aspiration effects. From the parent’s viewpoint, one 
has to distinguish between an inherited effect via the 
grandparental consumption and a transmitted effect via the 
parental consumption. 
The transmitted effect deals with the negative externality 
interpretation mentioned above. A parent characterized by a 
high level of consumption is expected to make more transfers 
to the child in order to compensate this negative externality. 
When the aspiration effect is high, there is a greater weight 
attached to the transmission of social status and the parent 
increases the optimal amount of gift, so that the child can 
hold a similar standard of living. Conversely, the inherited 
aspiration effect exerts a negative impact since it lessens 
the parent's level of satisfaction. For a given income Yp, a 
high value for the externality Cg leads to a decrease in the 
parental utility. Thus, the parent is expected to reduce the 
bequest to the child in order to maintain his social position 
in comparison with his own parent. 
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So, there is a trade-off for the parent between inherited 
and transmitted social status. When the inherited aspiration 
effect exceeds the transmitted aspiration effect (Cg>Cpσk/σp), 
the bequest value is likely to decrease in response to a 
higher value of the spillover h. 
To provide an illustration, we consider that the parent's 
utility is given by ln(Cp-hCg)+ βpln(Ck-hCp). Then, we obtain the 
following amount of transfer (with r=0) :  
T=[(βp(1+h)+h)Yp-βph(1+h)Cg-Yk]/[(1+βp)(1+h)]  (5) 
The key parameters here are the aspiration level h and the 
grandparent's consumption Cg. To get numerical values, we set 
Yp=10, Yk=5 and βp=0.8. In Figure 1, we present the optimal 
bequest values in accordance with both h and Cg. 
Basically, for a low value of Cg, the optimal financial 
amount is strictly increasing in the parameter h. But as one 
considers higher values for Cg, we remark progressively the 
presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
spillover h and the transfer T for a given grandparental 
consumption. In Figure 2, we represent the relative magnitude 
of the two aspiration effects. The inherited aspiration effect 
dominates the transmitted aspiration effect when both the 
grandparental consumption and the parameter h are set to 
important values, so that dT*/dh<0. But such a situation is 
unlikely to hold. When Cg is not greater than the parent's 
exogenous income Yp, we note that the transmitted aspiration 
effect is usually stronger than the inherited one. Thus, under 
reasonable conditions, one expects a positive impact of life 
standard aspirations on family transfers made to children.  
 
2.4. Risk aversion versus prudence : the role of uncertainty 
In the real world, the assumption that the child's level of 
income is known with certainty is questionable, especially 
after the child leaves the parental home. When the child lives 
far away from his parent, there is presumably not enough 
intergenerational contact and visits for the parent to have 
complete information on the economic situation of his progeny. 
Therefore, we relax the prevalent assumption of perfect 
observability and the child's income is now a random variable 
denoted by Ỹk=Yk+ε , where ε is an additive random term defined 
on the state space Ω=[-∆; ∆] and characterized by the density 
function f(ε) and the distribution function F(ε). We also make 
the assumptions that E(ε)=0 and V(ε)≥0. 
Given the uncertainty about Ỹk, the utility function for the 
parent is now : 
U(Yp-T-hCg)+∫Ω βpV(Ỹk+(1+r+h)T-hYp)dF(ε)   (6) 
Hence, the necessary condition for an interior maximum is : 
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-Uc(Yp-Tu-hCg)+βp(1+r+h)∫ΩVc(Ỹk+(1+r+h)Tu-hYp)dF(ε)=0 (7) 
where Tu indicates the optimal amount transferred to the child 
under uncertainty. In this framework, we question whether the 
randomness of the child's income increases or decreases the 
pattern of family transfer.  
Proposition 2. Given the uncertainty about the child's income, 
a prudent child is expected to receive a higher amount of 
bequest from his parent. 
Proof. To compare T* and Tu, let us define the function Ψ(ε) : 
Ψ(ε)=-Uc(Yp-T-hCg)+βp(1+r+h)Vc(Ỹk+(1+r+h)T-hYp) 
Hence, the optimal level of bequest under uncertainty is : 
∫Ω Ψ(ε)|T=TudF(ε)=0 
so that a necessary and sufficient condition to evaluate the 
effect of uncertainty on the bequest amount is to study the 
sign of ∫Ω Ψ(ε)|T=T*dF(ε). Thus, the value T* is greater 
(respectively lower) than Tu if the integral ∫Ω Ψ(ε)|T=TudF(ε) 
is negative (respectively positive). From the definition of 
Ψ(ε), the amount of bequest to the child in a certain 
environment satisfies the following condition : 
Ψ(E(ε)=0)=-Uc(Yp-T*-hCg)+βp(1+r+h)Vc(Ỹk+(1+r+h)T-hYp)=0 
Therefore, in virtue of the Jensen equality, we deduce that 
T*>Tu if and only if the condition ∫Ω Ψ(ε)|T=TudF(ε)<Ψ(E(ε)) 
holds (the converse holds for Tu>T*. We can note that the 
comparison between the two values T* and Tu depends on the 
convexity of the function Ψ(ε). In particular, we have Tu<T* 
when Ψ(ε) is a concave function of ε, a condition satisfied for 
Ψ'(ε)=βp(1+r+h)Vcc<0 and Ψ''(ε)=βp(1+r+h)Vccc<0, i.e. V'''<0. 
Conversely, the inequality T*<Tu holds when Ψ(ε) is a convex 
function of (ε), which requires Ψ''(ε)>0, i.e. V'''>0. QED 
So, the concept of risk aversion remains insufficient to 
explain changes in bequest behavior induced by the uncertain 
child's income. The assumption of imperfect information leads 
to a precautionary motive for transferring resources at death 
to one's child. The strength of this precautionary motive is 
measured through the concept of absolute prudence, expressed 
by the coefficient P(w)=-Uccc(w)/Ucc(w) for any initial wealth w 
(Kimball, 1990). A positive value for P, which corresponds to 
a prudent behavior for the child, gives rise to a higher level 
of amount transferred by the parent. 
Finally, even in an uncertain environment, the aspiration 
effect can either positively or negatively affect the optimal 
transfer made to the child. Thus, we now turn to an empirical 
analysis of the role of inherited habits on family decisions. 
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3. Empirical evidence 
3.1. The data 
We use a trigenerational study conducted in 1992 in France 
which focuses on the forms and dynamics of familial relations 
(Attias-Donfut and Wolff, 2000). The sample comprises families 
with at least three generations of adults. The design of the 
survey was to focus first on the intermediate generation and 
then to move on to the parents and adult children. 
A sample of middle-aged adults born between 1939 and 1943 
chosen at random from this cohort using the French census was 
selected. These persons were contacted by telephone in order 
to know whether they were still having surviving parents and 
adult children. Then, a random sample of 1958 people was 
constructed from among respondents meeting the conditions of 
the survey. During face-to-face interviews, respondent were 
asked to indicate the address of one parent and of one adult 
child. Among the parent generation, 1217 interviews were 
completed; 1493 children were carried out among the children. 
Thus, the full sample includes 4668 persons belonging to 995 
families. For the presentation, individuals are respectively 
termed as elders, pivots and children. 
The same questionnaires were administered to the three 
generations. For each individual, the survey provides detailed 
information on the recipient’s social and economic status and 
on forms of family transfers. In particular, questions 
concerning both financial and time transfers, either from 
parent-to-child or from child-to-parent, are included in the 
data set. This survey is thus especially useful for the 
purpose at hand, since we can study the transmission of 
transfers’ behaviors over succeeding generations. 
The key issue of our paper is to know whether transmission 
effects affect family decisions. Given the complex structure 
of the survey, we conduct two types of analyses. On the one 
hand, we examine the determinants of transfers given by a 
generation to one’s children. On the other hand, we focus on 
help decisions from the recipient’s viewpoint. In both cases, 
we run separate estimations for elders-pivots and pivots-
children transfers and restrict our attention to discrete 
choices of transferring resources. This methodology allows us 
to study the potential role of aspiration effects through the 
receipt in the past on both inter vivos gifts and bequests. 
In the former situation (donor’s viewpoint), we are forced 
to include in the regression only the characteristics of the 
donor including the receipt of transfer, since it is often 
impossible in the survey to know which child among siblings 
benefits from parental help. However, such an approach may 
give misleading estimates (Altonji et alii, 1997). Indeed, the 
optimal transfer value is a function of both the donor and 
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recipient’s levels of resources. Fortunately, the bias does no 
longer occur in the second case (recipient’s viewpoint). A 
specific person (pivot or child) can always be matched with 
one’s parents, so that we are able to control for covariates 
of the two generations including their levels of income. 
Both in France and in Italy, there exist previous studies 
that have examined the effects of transfer receipt on help 
decisions (Arrondel and Laferrère, 2001, Arrondel and Wolff, 
1998, Cigno et alii, 1998). A common result of these analyses 
is that the receipt of a transfer from parents in the past 
increases the probability to help one’s children. Clearly, 
this argues in favor of inherited habits effects, but the 
previous studies never control for income and wealth of the 
two generations concerned by the transfer. So, our econometric 
analysis allows us to obtain more robust conclusions. 
 
3.2. Evidence on retrospective effects 
For the presentation, we first focus on transfer decisions 
from elders to pivots. We find a positive impact of aspiration 
effect. Then, we turn to the help decisions from pivots to 
children and compare the results for both middle-aged and old 
generations. By including specific cohorts in the empirical 
analysis, we avoid the problems linked to the changing 
economic conditions and also to generation effects.  
In table 1, we examine the provision of money from elders 
to the pivots. Since elders do not indicate the different 
recipients, we include only the donor’s characteristics in the 
regression. The frequency of gift is estimated using a Probit 
model. The sample contains 1217 observations and there are 486 
donors (39.9%). Transfers are more likely for women and for 
old donors. The probability of gift decreases with the number 
of children. Variables associated with the economic position 
strongly affect gifts decisions. Elders are more likely to 
help their children when they are well educated and have high 
levels of both income and wealth. The wealth effect is really 
important and significant at the one percent level. 
We now introduce in the regression an additional variable 
which is equal to one when elders have themselves received a 
bequest or a gift from their parents in the past. According to 
the data, the receipt of a transfer significantly increases 
the probability of gift. This retrospective effect shows the 
role of inherited habits. Besides, the marginal effect of this 
variable is of high magnitude. The probability of transfer 
estimated at the means of the sample is equal to 39.2 
percentage points, and the receipt of inheritance from parents 
increases this probability of 22.4 points. We can also note 
that the effects of the other variables are affected by 
inherited transfers. In particular, the impact for the level 
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of parental wealth is no longer significant, certainly because 
we do not control for the amount of inheritance received. 
So far, we did not separate gift and financial help made by 
the elders. As shown by Arrondel and Wolff (1998), the receipt 
of a specific form of transfer may favor the transmission of 
the same type of transfer. This result also holds according to 
the data (Table 1). We estimate the joint probabilities that 
elders make a gift or a financial help to pivots using a 
bivariate Probit model. We observe that the receipt of bequest 
or gift in the past significantly increases the frequencies of 
transferring resources, either in the form of gift or help. 
However, a F-test indicates that the marginal impacts of 
inheritances on the two types of assistance are different. The 
receipt of past transfers implies a rise of 20.6 points of 
probability for gifts (the mean probability is 18.1%), but of 
7.8 points for financial help (the mean probability is 24.3%). 
A problem with the previous discussion is that we do not 
control for the characteristics of the recipients. To obtain 
robust results without econometric bias, we turn to the study 
of transfers received by the interviewed pivot from his 
parents. In so doing, we include the covariates of both the 
recipient and the donor in the regression, in particular their 
incomes. Among the 1217 observations, 343 pivots (28.2%) have 
received money from the elders. The data shows that transfers 
decisions are strongly affected by the economic position of 
the recipient. Education and wealth exerts a positive effect 
on the probability that a pivot receives money from parents, 
while the frequency is a decreasing function of the pivot’s 
income. This compensatory effect is consistent with the 
altruistic hypothesis, and also with the exchange model. 
Including the levels of income and wealth for the two 
generations does not affect the previous results. Indeed, the 
dummy variable which is equal to one when the pivot’s parents 
have received money from their own parents exerts a positive 
effect on the transfer decision (at the 1 percent level). 
Again, the marginal impact of transfer’s receipt is important, 
with a rise of 14.4 points of probability on gifts (the mean 
probability is 26.3 points). This role of inherited habits is 
not consistent with the standard altruism and exchange motives 
where past transfers do not affect family decisions. Finally, 
when one distinguishes gift and help, a bivariate Probit model 
indicates that the inheritance effect is positive and 
significant at the one percent level for gift, but the same 
variable has no significant impact for help. 
Our analysis shows that the inheritance effect is observed 
even with only the donor’s characteristics. It is known that 
not controlling for the child’s income may affect the 
conclusions of empirical studies on family motives (Altonji et 
alii, 1997), but this is not the case for aspiration effects. 
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Another source of bias is due to family heterogeneity. For 
instance, parental altruism is unobservable. Since unobserved 
parental generosity is different among families, this may bias 
the econometric results. With observations on transfers from 
elders to each of their children, we can control for 
unobserved heterogeneity within the family by using panel data 
methods. For that purpose, we focus on gifts made by elders to 
their various children and we construct a new sample where 
each parent-child pair is counted as one observation. There 
are now 4519 observations corresponding to 1214 families. The 
proportion of recipients is about 17.5%.  
The corresponding estimates are reported in Table 3. We 
first estimate a Probit model on the parent-child sample and 
introduce only the donor’s characteristics. According to the 
data, the inheritance effect is strongly significant, and this 
is the most important factor when one attempts to explain 
gifts decisions. However, unobserved heterogeneity due to 
multiple recipients per family is likely to bias the results, 
so that we also estimate a random-effects Probit model. Again, 
the receipt of bequests or gifts from parents exerts a 
positive and important impact on the decision of transferring 
resources to pivots. In both cases, accounting for the pivot’s 
characteristics does not affect this conclusion, with a high 
marginal impact. Thus, aspiration effects are important in the 
context of intergenerational family behavior. 
A question worth is to know whether the role of inherited 
habits is also relevant for younger generations. Therefore, we 
estimate similar regression for transfers between pivots and 
their adult children. We adopt the same presentation as before 
for the results, by focusing first on transfers given by 
pivots and then on help receipt for children. For a sample of 
1958 pivots, the proportion of donors is about 47.5%. This 
high value is due to the needy position of the children, who 
enters their adult life. The data shows that the probability 
of helping a child is an increasing function of the pivot’s 
education, income, and wealth (Table 4). With altruism, richer 
parents are more likely to care for their children and thus 
redistribute resources. To evaluate the role of inherited 
habits, we add two additional dummies in the regression 
concerning the receipt of transfer for pivots, one for 
financial help and one for bequests and gifts. 
We make a distinction between these two types of help since 
some studies have shown that financial help are linked to 
investment in human capital, while bequests and gifts mainly 
correspond to a transmission of parental wealth (Arrondel and 
Wolff, 1998). The family motive is really different for these 
two forms of transfers. For instance, there are very few gifts 
at young age. The fact that donations are made later in the 
life course is less consistent with altruism, since parents 
should devote more resources to the children when the latter 
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are liquidity constrained. According to the trigenerational 
survey, the two dummies play a positive and significant role 
in the regression (at the one percent level).  
Nevertheless, one can observe that the marginal effect is 
higher for help than for bequests or gifts. The rise of the 
estimated probability of transfer (about 47.8% at the sample 
means) is equal to 21.6 points for the receipt of help and to 
8.9 points for the receipt of bequest or gift. The hypothesis 
that these two coefficients are equal is definitely rejected 
at the 1 percent level. Again, this result favors the idea 
that aspirations effects also concern the nature of the family 
transmission. When one estimates a bivariate Probit for help 
and gift, we observe that a donor who has been helped by his 
parents in the past is more likely to help his children. But 
the same covariate exerts a negative and insignificant effect 
on the gift decision. While a test rejects the equality of 
help receipt for gift and help transfer, the same hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for bequests or gifts receipt. 
Finally, we focus on the child’s viewpoint and include the 
pivot and child’s characteristics. Transfers are more likely 
to occur when the parents is rich and the child is poor (Table 
5). For a sample of 1336 children, the receipt of transfers in 
the past still increases the frequency of making a transfer. 
However, the marginal impacts are lower for young generations. 
The probability of help is increased by 5.5 points when the 
pivot has received bequests or gifts from parents and by 9.6 
points when the receipt concerns financial help. In addition, 
the two coefficients are not significantly different. We reach 
similar conclusions when we only estimate the occurrence of 
financial help for a child or when we make a difference 
between money and loan received by donors in the past. 
So, our empirical analysis points out the role of inherited 
habits for family transfers. A child is more likely to be 
helped by his parents when the latter have themselves been 
financially helped by their own parents. In addition, the 
inherited effect leads to an increased transmission of the 
form of transfer itself. A final result is that the role of 
inherited habits is stronger for older generations. The reason 
is that for younger generations, the level of transfer from 
parents is more sensitive to the needs of the children. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed predictions of an 
altruistic model of bequest resulting from the introduction of 
extended preferences. New theoretical results are derived with 
respect to the previous literature, suggesting that one has to 
pay close attention to attitudes towards risk within families 
when looking at the determinants of inheritances and 
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intergenerational transfers. The strength of inherited habits 
is expected to exert of positive effect on transfer decisions 
and there may exist a precautionary motive for transferring 
resources to children under uncertainty. So, variables dealing 
with risk attitudes and transfer receipt in the past have to 
be included in empirical tests to better explain the transfer 
decisions within the family. 
From an empirical perspective, we believe that the higher 
levels of intergenerational assistance observed during the two 
last decades in developed countries may be due to the growing 
role of inherited habits over the succeeding generations. 
Another plausible factor is the response that parents give to 
the risk that prudent children are faced with an environment 
of increased uncertainty, in particular because of the rising 
risk of unemployment and unstable family structures. 
A final comment deals with the policy issues raised by this 
altruistic model with inherited tastes. Any program that 
currently affects the level of public subsidies will have a 
long-term impact on the provision of family transfers given 
the role of inherited habits. When receiving money, parents 
will redistribute more resources because they are richer. In 
addition, by making private transfers, parents shape the 
preferences of their children, who are in turn expected to 
make more gifts to their own children. At the same time, a 
public policy is likely to decrease the level of environmental 
risk. This impact can significantly contribute to a decline in 
the family redistribution to the young generations, by 
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Table 1. Transfers given by the elders to the pivots. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Gift/Help Gift/Help Gift Help 
 coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test 
Constant -1.836 -3.09 -1.821 -3.01 -4.086 -5.77 0.284 0.44 
Elder’s characteristics         
Female -0.319 -3.36 -0.326 -3.38 -0.115 -1.02 -0.309 -3.09 
Widow 0.140 1.58 0.173 1.93 0.120 1.15 0.106 1.12 
Age 0.017 2.45 0.015 2.09 0.038 4.55 -0.017 -2.16 
Number of children -0.022 -1.45 -0.024 -1.53 -0.040 -2.12 -0.002 -0.12 
Education 0.019 1.63 0.007 0.58 0.008 0.54 0.001 0.07 
Income (10e-4) 0.161 1.48 0.247 2.19 -0.131 -0.96 0.390 2.96 
Wealth (10e-6) 0.262 3.13 0.126 1.48 -0.059 -0.60 0.285 3.01 
Bequests/gifts from parents   0.593 7.57 0.790 8.72 0.250 2.98 
Transfer receipt: gift=help 
Chi2 (d.f., prob) 
     
20.13 (1,0.00) 
Number of recipients 486 486 251 311 
Number of observations 1217 1217 1217 









Source: Survey Cnav Trois Générations 1992. 
Note: (1) and (2) are estimated using Probit models with robust standard errors, (3) is 





Table 2. Transfers received by pivots from elders. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Gift/Help Gift/Help Gift Help 
 coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test 
Constant -3.041 -4.59 -3.097 -4.59 -4.121 -5.58 -2.029 -2.40 
Elder’s characteristics         
Female -0.102 -0.99 -0.088 -0.85 -0.110 -0.98 -0.003 -0.02 
Widow 0.052 0.55 0.063 0.65 0.021 0.20 0.092 0.77 
Age 0.026 3.36 0.024 3.12 0.037 4.40 -0.003 -0.35 
Number of children -0.066 -3.95 -0.067 -4.02 -0.048 -2.66 -0.066 -2.92 
Education 0.023 1.82 0.016 1.24 0.025 1.77 -0.003 -0.19 
Income (l0e-4) -0.046 -0.40 0.001 0.01 -0.196 -1.38 0.254 2.02 
Wealth (l0e-6) 0.074 0.89 -0.024 -0.28 -0.003 -0.04 0.089 0.89 
Bequests/gifts from parents   0.444 5.34 0.632 6.75 -0.015 -0.14 
Pivot’s characteristics         
Female -0.088 -1.10 -0.105 -1.30 -0.090 -1.01 -0.026 -0.26 
Widow 0.116 0.88 0.121 0.91 -0.081 -0.56 0.186 1.16 
Number of children -0.030 -0.84 -0.021 -0.56 -0.055 -1.49 0.022 0.51 
Education 0.035 2.43 0.035 2.34 0.012 0.70 0.067 3.93 
Income (l0e-4) -0.164 -3.26 -0.139 -2.76 -0.166 -2.93 -0.062 -1.04 
Wealth (l0e-6) 0.252 4.28 0.230 4.00 0.329 5.23 -0.027 -0.38 
Transfer receipt: gift=help 
Chi2 (d.f., prob) 
     
22.57 (1,0.00) 
Number of recipients 343 343 241 136 
Number of observations 1217 1217 1217 









Source: Survey Cnav Trois Générations 1992. 
Note: (1) and (2) are estimated using Probit models with robust standard errors, (3) is 
estimated using a Bivariate Probit model with robust standard errors (rho=0.079,t=1.11). 
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Table 3. Distribution of transfers from elders to pivots. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Gift Gift Gift Gift 
 coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test 
Constant -4.112 -10.71 -21.911 -8.54 -4.388 -11.02 -22.487 -7.96 
Elder’s characteristics         
Female -0.197 -3.06 -0.575 -1.25 -0.195 -3.00 -1.487 -3.61 
Age 0.037 8.14 0.155 6.24 0.039 7.47 0.235 7.15 
Widow 0.159 2.71 0.840 2.65 0.162 2.77 0.364 1.27 
Number of children -0.067 -6.74 -0.388 -6.29 -0.068 -6.78 -0.441 -7.31 
Education 0.016 0.47 1.115 4.53 0.016 0.47 -1.820 -7.14 
Farmer 0.651 7.97 1.436 2.19 0.638 7.70 1.467 2.56 
Independent 0.091 0.86 1.206 1.77 0.090 0.85 1.786 3.28 
Executive/intermediary -0.353 -2.96 -5.294 -4.62 -0.364 -3.04 -0.536 -0.72 
Employee/worker -0.217 -2.71 -3.775 -4.62 -0.229 -2.84 -3.034 -5.26 
Income (l0e-4) 0.241 3.36 -0.465 -1.24 0.242 3.37 0.569 1.42 
Wealth (l0e-6) -0.086 -1.42 0.307 0.91 -0.082 -1.35 0.738 2.46 
Bequests/gifts from parents 0.656 12.61 4.155 9.81 0.659 12.62 5.330 10.04 
Pivot’s characteristics         
Female     0.060 1.24 -0.250 -1.34 
Married     0.263 3.41 0.184 0.64 
Age     -0.003 -0.64 0.009 0.56 
Number of children     0.072 0.75 -0.155 -0.39 
Education     -0.007 -0.25 0.027 0.21 
Number of recipients 792 792 792 792 
Number of observations 4519 4519 4519 4519 
Number of families 1214 1214 1214 1214 











Source: Survey Cnav Trois Générations 1992. 
Note: (1) and (3) are estimated using Probit models with robust standard errors, (2) and 
(4) are estimated using random-effects Probit models.  
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Table 4. Transfers given by the pivots to the children. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Gift/Help Gift/Help Help Gift 
 coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test 
Constant -0.761 -3.91 -0.705 -3.56 -0.777 -3.94 -1.780 -4.52 
Pivot’s characteristics         
Female 0.020 0.35 0.018 0.30 -0.009 -0.15 0.030 0.27 
Married -0.112 -1.38 -0.137 -1.67 -0.139 -1.70 0.118 0.69 
Number of children 0.009 0.40 0.006 0.28 0.012 0.55 -0.054 -0.98 
Education 0.020 1.97 0.008 0.77 0.012 1.19 -0.014 -0.71 
Income (10e-4) 0.202 4.91 0.222 5.30 0.218 5.12 -0.067 -0.91 
Wealth (10e-6) 0.136 2.99 0.104 2.23 0.075 1.63 0.191 3.11 
Help from parents   0.555 5.82 0.595 6.25 -0.024 -0.14 
Bequests/gifts from parents   0.223 3.73 0.196 3.26 0.223 1.98 
Receipt: help=bequest/gift 







Help receipt: gift=help 
Chi2 (d.f., prob) 
     
10.68 (1,0.00) 
Bequest/gift receipt:gift=help 
Chi2 (d.f., prob) 
     
0.05 (1,0.82) 
Number of recipients 931 931 902 65 
Number of observations 1958 1958 1958 









Source: Survey Cnav Trois Générations 1992. 
Note: (1) and (2) are estimated using Probit models with robust standard errors, (3) is 





Table 5. Transfers received by children from pivots. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Gift/Help Gift/Help Help Help 
 coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test coef t-test 
Constant -0.294 -0.57 -0.223 -0.43 -0.527 -1.00 -0.556 -1.06 
Pivot’s characteristics         
Female -0.026 -0.35 -0.032 -0.43 -0.055 -0.73 -0.059 -0.78 
Married -0.282 -2.71 -0.301 -2.88 -0.187 -1.77 -0.184 -1.74 
Number of children -0.141 -4.36 -0.145 -4.48 -0.130 -3.90 -0.126 -3.79 
Education 0.021 1.42 0.015 0.96 0.011 0.72 0.012 0.80 
Income (10e-4) 0.088 1.83 0.099 2.05 0.138 2.80 0.139 2.83 
Wealth (10e-6) 0.208 3.57 0.185 3.11 0.165 2.75 0.161 2.66 
Bequests/gifts from parents   0.144 1.94 0.075 1.00 0.076 1.00 
Help (money/loan) from parents   0.247 2.17 0.272 2.35   
Money from parents       0.452 1.80 
Loan from parents       -0.220 -0.84 
Child’s characteristics         
Female 0.143 1.94 0.153 2.07 0.159 2.11 0.156 2.07 
Age -0.014 -0.90 -0.014 -0.93 -0.015 -0.96 -0.015 -0.95 
Married -0.251 -2.80 -0.243 -2.70 -0.240 -2.63 -0.238 -2.61 
Number of children 0.080 1.58 0.083 1.62 0.094 1.80 0.091 1.75 
Education 0.032 1.97 0.030 1.87 0.038 2.32 0.038 2.33 
Income (10e-4) -0.256 -3.67 -0.248 -3.51 -0.239 -3.37 -0.241 -3.37 
Wealth (10e-6) -0.152 -1.14 -0.165 -1.25 -0.348 -2.50 -0.337 -2.39 
Receipt: help=bequest/gift 







Chi2 (d.f., prob) 
    
1.83 (1,0.18)
Number of recipients 511 511 463 463 
Number of observations 1336 1336 1336 1336 











Source: Survey Cnav Trois Générations 1992. 
Note: (1), (2), (3) and (4) are estimated using Probit models with robust standard 
errors. 
 
 
 
 
